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The non-implementation of political decisions is a major challenge of contemporary political life. Policy 
analysis has devoted careful attention to implementation gaps resulting from administrative non-
compliance with political orders. However, the fact that political authorities actually want to enforce 
all policies should not be taken as granted. This article proposes a conceptual model that 
systematically accounts for cross-agency divergence and convergence processes both at the political 
and at the street levels. We find that in inter-sectoral policies, dissent between different heads of 
agencies (political level) or between groups of implementing bureaucrats (street level) rather than 
dissent between the political and the street-level can be a major cause of non-compliance. Based on 
a comparative dataset on the implementation of the smoking ban in 12 Swiss states, the article 
analyzes cross-agency fragmentation processes. It advocates a stronger dialogue between street-level 
bureaucracy and policy coordination literatures, and nuances the conceptualization of (non-
)compliance in a cross-agency context.  
Keywords: street-level bureaucrats, policy compliance, street-level divergence, cross-agency 




Policy compliance and the conditions under which the designing and implementation structure of a 
public intervention could enhance compliance has received much attention in the policy analysis field. 
Research is often “motivated by the question of how to better align policymakers’ intentions with 
street-level implementation actions” (Gofen, 2014: 477) and has thus devoted much attention to the 
conflicting goals between policymakers and implementers, identifying various ways by which the 
political will can be transposed, distorted or even ignored by the street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) (May 
and Wood, 2003; Meyers and Vorsanger, 2003). The discretion of bureaucrats in implementing policies 
has received vast attention (Tummers and Bekkers, 2014), whereby the discussion about how and to 
which extent politics has to control bureaucrats’ discretion has historically held prominent place in 
public administration scholarly debate (Rosser and Mavrot, 2017). However, the assumption that 
policymakers’ intentions represent a unified and coherent will is far from being an empirical reality 
(Neveu, 2015). The questions of interagency coordination (Peters, 2006), rivalry (Hassenteufel, 2003: 
5) and fragmentation (Gortmaker et al., 2011) as well as conflicting priorities (Palley, 2006) or the lack 
of political agreement on a given issue (Torenvlied, 1996) have also been identified as core challenges.   
The potential causes for non-compliance thus not only lie at the street-level itself, but may sometimes 
be rooted in interagency dissents at the political level. Based on these insights, the core question this 
paper examines through an empirical investigation is how different cross-agency configurations 
influence street-level compliance. We argue that the literature on policy compliance can benefit from 
the literature on policy coordination. Taking into account the complex interplays between different 
administrative agencies involved in the implementation of a policy, and the possible political dissents 
at the head of agencies, allows for a non-linear understanding of policy compliance. 
This issue is topical because most of crucial contemporary societal challenges require inter-sectoral 
interventions and are strongly affected by cross-agency divergence issues. In our example, the focus 
is on the necessary and often lacking cooperation between health, security, economic, and building 
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and transport agencies in the enforcement of smoking bans. The article focuses on two overlooked 
aspects of policy (non-)compliance. First, it investigates cross-agency divergences at the political level, 
at the light of conflicting policy clientele and conflicting policy objectives. Second, we focus on the 
street-level by analyzing the relationships between SLBs from different agencies whose cooperation 
is required to enforce the policy. To successfully implement the smoking ban, health bureaucrats need 
the cooperation of other agencies who hold law and order responsibilities (police, labor inspectors, 
food and hygiene inspectors) and do not always perceive the enforcement of the ban as a priority. 
Thus, the article explores the specificities of policy subsystems where the implementation 
responsibility (i.e., health bureaucrats) is uncoupled from the implementation capacities (i.e., security 
and economy bureaucrats).  A conceptual model that depicts (non-)compliance in situations of cross-
agency indifference, divergence or convergence is introduced, demonstrating the necessity of 
adopting an inter-agency perspective. 
The first section of the article draws on the street-level bureaucracy and implementation literature to 
gain insights on the factors influencing policy (non-)compliance. After exposing the research design, 
we turn to a comparative analysis of the smoking ban enforcement within twelve Swiss subnational 
units, to examine cross-agency implementation dynamics. These results are then discussed by linking 
the SLB literature with research on policy coordination. The article ends with conclusive remarks about 
policy compliance and identifies areas for further research regarding cross-agency policy analysis.  
 
Theoretical framework: Street-level bureaucrats and policy coordination 
Street-level bureaucrats at the crossroads: The case for a relational approach  
Street-level bureaucrats are defined as frontline workers that are in direct contact with citizens and 
enjoy discretion and autonomy when performing their duties (Maynard‐Moody and Portillo, 2010). As 
Michael Lipsky (1980: 13) has shown, “the position of street-level bureaucrats regularly permits them 
to make policy with respect to significant aspects of their interactions with citizens”. The discretion 
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component is a much discussed aspect of bureaucrats’ activities and the possible gap between the 
political will and the effective implementation actions has been widely documented.  
Policy compliance can be described as the effective execution of a policy by implementation agents 
the way it had been set out by politics. Thereby, street-level non-compliance rarely takes the form of 
direct rejection or disobedience, but is commonly manifested in daily micro practice such as deviance, 
negotiation, rule adaptation or the prioritization of some tasks at the expense of others. In this sense, 
it appears more appropriate to label the (partially) non-compliant actions of implementation actors 
as street-level divergence (Gofen, 2015). Several factors were found to foster non-compliant behavior: 
For instance, SLBs tend to prioritize the expected value for citizens over the compliance with the 
political will (Tummers et al., 2015), whereas decreasing bureaucratic capacity and excessive workload 
also reduce policy compliance (Huber and McCarty, 2004; Goodman et al., 2007).  Moreover, 
politicians and bureaucrats can have conflicting political preferences, affecting SLBs’ motivation to 
enforce the respective policies (Torenvlied, 1996).   
 
Cross-agency fragmentation, coordination and rivalry 
The large body of literature on street-level divergence, mainly focused on dissent from SLBs with the 
public authorities, whereby the latter were often being treated as a unified collective actor. However, 
cross-agency fragmentation and concurrence complicate the picture. Both vertical (i.e., hierarchical) 
and horizontal (i.e., inter-organizational) policy cooperation mechanisms must be taken into account 
(Ayres and Stafford, 2012: 337). Indeed, the way interconnected issues are (de)coupled across 
agencies can have a crucial impact on the policy outcome (Hernes, 2020). In cases of cross-agency 
fragmentation, different groups of SLBs have to coordinate their action, although not belonging to the 
same hierarchical chain of command. This creates situations with a potentially insufficiently clear 
division of tasks as well as diffused accountability and control mechanisms (Molenveld et al., 2020a: 
2). Hence, cross-agency coordination might be the answer. However, a close empirical attention 
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should be given to cross-agency coupling processes, because they can be genuinely substantial, or 
serve a purely symbolic function for political purposes (Hernes, 2020). 
In the case of policy programs, one agency is likely to be the lead agency responsible for the program, 
whilst the cooperation of partner agencies is needed because the latter hold the enforcement 
monopoly regarding some aspects of the program. For instance, health agencies are likely to be the 
lead agencies in enforcing tobacco control, whilst the department of justice is a partner agency 
because its SLBs (i.e., police officers) have the exclusive right to control whether clients smoke in bars.  
The awareness that conflicts may arise between different sectors about policies that require 
collaboration is not new to the literature on policy coordination (Trein, 2017a). Such coordination 
mechanisms can vary from “loosely coupled networks” to highly formalized joint service delivery 
(Hulst and van Montfort, 2012: 123). According to Trein (2017b), two factors influence the degree to 
which individuals or groups from different policy sectors are coupled: distinctiveness and 
responsiveness. Distinctiveness, meaning that policy sectors are allocated to different institutions 
such as “a horizontal separation into different ministries and administrations”, tends to decrease the 
intensity of coupling (Trein, 2017b: 422). Governmental structures where policy sectors are 
thematically entrenched into different administrations thereby complicates coupling processes. 
Responsiveness, which increases coupling, captures whether there exists a cooperation between 
actors from different policy sectors “to achieve common policy output” (Trein, 2017b: 422). Using the 
SLB-terminology, responsive actors strive for cross-agency convergence whereas non-responsive 
actors create cross-agency divergence. In addition, horizontal cooperation mechanisms face 
numerous challenges, like accountability issues (Peters, 2006) or organizational routines (Peters, 
2015).  
Moreover, the involved agencies can be led by politicians of different parties, which might add a 
partisan competition component to the process (Busch, 2008). This may lead to a lack of top-down 
incentives for cross-sector cooperation.  Moreover, as Torenvlied (1996: 25) has shown, “[p]olitical 
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consensus does not generally enhance compliance—as is often asserted—but does so conditional 
upon a low agency salience”, i.e., when bureaucrats do not have a specific professional incentive for 
policy divergence such as for instance conflicting professional norms or an excessive workload. In 
contrast, high agency salience and/or cross-agency political fragmentation can be seen as factors 
increasing the odds of street-level divergence.  
A conceptual model for policy compliance in cross-agency configurations 
Based on these theoretical considerations, a conceptual model depicting the possible paths of policy 
implementation in cross-agency contexts is proposed in Figure 1. This model draws on the theoretical 
complexity detailed above. On the one hand, it accounts for the fact that although formally agreeing 
on a policy program, policymakers themselves can actually aim at implementation or in the contrary 
impede it (cross-agency policy convergence or divergence). On the other hand, the model also 
accounts for the interrelations between different groups of street-level bureaucrats at the delivery 
level (cross-agency street-level convergence or divergence). Hence, cross-agency convergence is 
defined as the willingness of given agencies to collaborate around a policy or a program led by other 
agencies. Importantly, the political will is not conceptualized as unified, but as the fragmented result 
of interagency rivalries or diverging priorities. Moreover, the conceptual model accounts not only for 
political convergence or divergence, but also includes the possibility of political indifference at the 
head of agencies. In cases of street-level convergence, a collaboration is established between 
bureaucrats of two or more distinct agencies at the lower governance level. In cases of street-level 
divergence, the partner agencies do not prioritize the request of the lead agency. To sum up, the 
model focuses on: a) inter-agency cases and the related policy games at the political and street levels, 
b) the possibility of political indifference. We formulate the following expectations that are examined 
empirically in the next section:  
Expectation 1: Cross-agency political convergence fosters street-level convergence and policy 
compliance by giving a clear and consistent mandate to the different groups of SLBs.    
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Expectation 2: Cross-agency political divergence hampers street-level convergence and policy 
compliance by setting conflicting priorities for the different groups of SLBs. 
Expectation 3: The absence of any explicit political directive (political indifference) may lead to either 
policy compliance or non-compliance, depending on the SLBs capacity to create bottom-up street-
level convergence.  
Expectation 4: In case of political indifference, street-level convergence is less likely to happen when 
there is a high agency salience on the issue. 
 






Data, Method and Operationalization 
The comparative analysis is based on a most similar systems design and uses data (collected between 
2012 and 2018) from the smoking ban enforcement in seven German-speaking and five French-
speaking Swiss states (i.e., the cantons, subnational governmental units)1. A comparison of 
implementation processes in Swiss states is particularly suitable for most similar systems designs, 
since macro contextual factors and the institutional design are stable, allowing for a robust 
 




comparison of the conditions that vary across the states (Sager and Thomann, 2017). The examined 
smoking policies are all implemented within the same national political system, whilst the actor 
configurations and the specific policy settings vary from state to state. The data was collected within 
a research and evaluation project assessing the effect of a tobacco control policy reform from 2012 
that took the form of non-mandatory prevention programs: subnational governments could 
implement the new program at the local level in exchange for national seed money. The analyzed 
subnational policies thus represent all the cases of an opportunity sample, made of 12 voluntary states 
who had chosen to launch a program2. We analyzed the designing and three years of implementation 
of each subnational policy. The multiple case design of our study allows for a high robustness of the 
results, with a comparison of 12 governance units. 
The data include 38 interviews with officials from the health, security, economic and/or the building 
and transport agencies of each state and members of non-governmental organizations and 72 self-
evaluation reports about the smoking ban enforcement project(s) in each state (one to two concerned 
projects per state –public space and/or workplaces). The self-evaluation grids contained qualitative 
observations of the implementing actors and quantitative data related to the projects’ outputs (e.g., 
number of inspections or sanctions) and the outcome attainment (i.e., target group response). Third, 
the policy history and context was assessed in each state through a content analysis of 13 years of 
parliamentary debates and a media analysis of six years on tobacco control. In addition, a set of 
subnational documentation (e.g., policy concepts, official reports) was analyzed. For a detailed display 
of the data, see Dataset and for an overview of the smoking ban projects, and the implementation 
actors, see Appendix. 
We operationalized the core concepts as follows: We categorized SLB behavior as ‘compliant’ 
whenever the activities planned to enforce the smoking ban in public space and/or workplaces were 
implemented as defined in the policy concept. In projects where activities were not implemented as 
 
2 Fourteen states run a program, but two of them are not included in the study because they did not have any 
smoking ban project. 
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planned, SLB behavior was categorized as ‘non-compliant’. The categorization is based on a document 
analysis of the policy concepts to identify the set goals as well as on the self-evaluation reports and 
interviews providing information on the actual implementation. We therefore consider compliance at 
the implementation level, and not at the policy level in the sense of the overall policy performance. 
While compliance can depict the attitude of single groups of SLBs from one agency alone, convergence 
and divergence are relational concepts: they depict a relationship between groups of actors from 
different agencies (at the political or the street level).  
Concerning the three mutually exclusive concepts convergence, divergence and indifference at the 
political level, we applied the following operationalization rules: Whenever SLB received explicit and 
uniform orders of the various heads of agencies involved to implement the policy, we categorized the 
situation as ‘political convergence’ (or “convergence at the political level”). In case of explicit orders 
of the head of a partner agency not to implement the policy or to prioritize other tasks at the expense 
of the policy analyzed, whilst the head of the lead agency supported implementation, the category 
‘‘political divergence’ was applied. Whenever the involved head of agencies issued no explicit order 
concerning the implementation of the policies, the category ‘(political) indifference’ applied. Similarly, 
the category “street-level convergence” was chosen when bureaucrats from different agencies 
worked together to implement the policy of the lead agency (whether there was a political order to 
do so or not). “Street-level divergence” was used in the absence of such horizontal cooperation among 
SLBs from the lead and the partner agencies.  
The categorization of SLB’s activities as ‘compliant’ or ‘non-compliant’ was based on the self-
evaluation reports. When 80% of the objectives were achieved (mostly quantitative objectives: 
number of controls per year), the situation was categorized as a compliance case; when less than 80% 
of the objectives were met, SLB’s were considered as non-compliant. The categorization of political 
convergence, divergence and indifference was mainly based on the qualitative data extracted from 
the interviews. To avoid sensitivity bias (i.e., leeway in the categorization of each case), a variety of 
partners was interviewed in each state (implementation agents, external observers, program and 
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project managers). The interview data from each state was cross-checked, and the number of 
interviewees per state ranged from 2 to 7.  
Support or opposition to the policy at the political level were acknowledged when interviewees 
referred to concrete and explicit political attitudes in favor or against the enforcement of the policy. 
An example of a statement documenting support is: “after the police said ‘it doesn’t belong to our 
tasks’ (…) the head of the [lead] agency conducted a governmental discussion (…) and this was then 
accepted” (public servant, Basel-City). An example of statement substantiating political obstruction 
was: “The politician at the head of the Health Department has already tried to contact the politician 
at the head of the Economy Department, but was unable to move the issue forward. The strategy of 
the steering body is now to wait for the next governmental reelection to thematize the issue again” 
(project leader, Fribourg). In the cases categorized as political indifference, interviewees declared 
there were no political signals pushing for or restraining the enforcement of the policy, and 
implementation actors felt free to decide themselves whether to prioritize this task or not. An example 
reads as follows: “I never felt any political pressure on my control activities (...). But obviously, the 
state depends a lot on the tobacco industry. (...) this is part of the political job to support the economy, 
that is normal (...) but the law is very clear and we apply it” (inspector, Neuchâtel). To ensure 
consistency and robustness, all categorizations were cross-checked by the two authors, who were also 
the one who gathered the data. The classification operations were held constant across the studied 
implementations years and the 12 states. 
The smoking ban in Switzerland: Adoption and implementation responsibilities 
The smoking ban in federal Switzerland provides an excellent case to examine cross-agency tensions 
in various local policy configurations. As has been noted, there is little literature studying tobacco 
control in Switzerland from a political science perspective (Trein, 2017c: 116). However, the strength 
of the tobacco industry and its influence on the policy processes in Switzerland have been documented 
(Lee and Glantz, 2001). A recent study has compared the enforcement of tobacco regulation in 14 
Swiss states and highlights the importance of political, professional and economical factors in 
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explaining local policy outcomes (Sager et al., 2020). At the legislative level, the Swiss Federal Passive 
Smoking Protection Act sets a smoking ban on public spaces and in bars and restaurants, however, 
allowing for certain exceptions (e.g., ventilated smoking rooms). The Federal Passive Smoking 
Protection Act also forbids smoking in closed spaces that serve as workplaces for more than one 
person. According to the division of tasks within Swiss federalism, the states have the responsibility to 
enforce the smoking ban on their territory. They must at least enforce the national legislation, but can 
also be stricter (e.g., no smoking rooms). Politically, the Federal Act is sometimes used as an excuse at 
the local level to adopt the minimal regulation and not to go beyond national requirements. However, 
the local configuration of actors and the history of the policy subsystem are decisive in understanding 
the policy outcome at the state level (Mavrot and Sager, 2018). 
In this context, we define the subnational health agencies (collaborating with parapublic health 
organizations in some states) as the lead agency of the cantonal programs, and the other agencies 
whose involvement is necessary as the partner agencies.3 As Figure 2 shows, in ensuring an effective 
enforcement of the smoking ban, health agencies need the field work of the SLBs in charge of the 
control tasks (police, work inspectorate, hygiene inspectorate), who however do not fall within their 
scope of authority because they belong to other agencies (e.g., economy agency, security agency). The 
exact division of competences between these actors differ in each state (see Appendix). The heads of 
agencies are elected politicians from various parties and belong to the state government (five to seven 
government members per state). The bureaucrats in charge of the enforcement of the smoking ban 







3 We refer to these agencies by these general names in this paper, although their exact names and organizations 
vary from state to state. 
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The following section details the case studies and asserts the conditions leading to policy compliance 
or non-compliance. 
Case study: Comparative cross-agency configurations  
Cross-agency political convergence. One of the first states (Basel-City) that passed a subnational 
smoking ban in 2008 (i.e., before the national legislation was introduced), exemplifies the case of 
cross-agency political convergence. When introduced, the ban caused considerable outrage among 
parts of the population and led to the formation of an association seeking loopholes in the legislation 
to continue smoking in public spaces. This was followed by years of struggle between the association 
and the state administration, which insisted on enforcing the ban. Here, implementation conflicts on 
the ground, the high public attention and the political salience of the issue are conditions which 
contributed to cross-agency political convergence. When the newly launched policy program was 
introduced in 2014 with the health agency’s mandate to ensure the implementation of the smoking 
ban, the building and transport agency holding the implementation capacity had already established 
a rigorous control system that strongly reduced ban violations. Specifically, the head of the building 
and transport agency (a member of the Social Democratic Party (SDP)) had released extra resources 
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to expand the control apparatus. Finally, the controls outperformed the initial policy objectives and 
were sufficient to ensure proper enforcement in the whole state. The decision to increase resources 
was taken after debates about the insufficient enforcement of the smoking ban had been held in the 
state parliament, whilst the responsible office had complained about the impossibility of 
implementing control without the necessary resources, shifting the blame for non-compliance to the 
head of agencies level.  
The building and transport agency had itself taken measures to avoid blame resulting from non-
compliant enforcement of this salient policy issue generating considerable media coverage in the 
state. Hence, the experience with previous implementation clashes and related blame avoidance 
reactions contributed to policy compliance, through an extra budget allocation process. The resulting 
shared political will of the two agencies to enforce the legislation led to a situation where all SLBs 
involved had a clear mission and sufficient resources to ensure compliance. Thereby, both agencies 
explicitly took credit for the strong law enforcement that finally led to a dissolution of organized 
resistance. The attribution of political credit not only to the lead agency in charge of the policy but 
also to the partner agency helping to enforce it therefore constitutes another important condition to 
foster inter-agency political convergence. 
Cross-agency political divergence. A state of the French-speaking part of Switzerland with a strong 
public health administrative tradition and a historically right-wing liberal political anchorage (Vaud) 
exemplifies an open dispute between two administrative agencies for reasons of political priorities 
and administrative clientele. The health agency, led by a SDP politician, decided to enhance the 
enforcement of the smoking ban in the workplaces, after a public survey showed little compliance in 
the state. However, the health agency had no authority to conduct field inspections itself, and required 
the cooperation of the labor inspectorate located in the agency of economy, led by an elected member 
of the right-wing Liberal Radical Party (LRP). The inversion of political majorities at the head of the two 
agencies was an important condition for cross-agency divergence and, ultimately, non-compliance. 
The health agency tried to activate the agency of economy through the hierarchical way, at a political 
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level. The agency of economy signaled that burdening the enterprises with more health-related 
inspections was not part of its priorities. Importantly, the electoral clientele of the LRP includes local 
business networks, which would have been affected by such controls. In the public positions of this 
party in the state (e.g., parliamentary debates), public health in general and tobacco control in 
particular are depicted as an unnecessary interference by the state in private behavior.  
The fact that these two parties historically represent different political clienteles played as an 
important factor that hampered the enforcement of the smoking ban. Facing this blockage, the health 
agency did not attempt to contact the SLBs of the labor inspectorate directly as other states did. It was 
deemed politically too sensitive because of this clear-cut opposition, and a negative reaction from the 
inspectorate was anticipated. Thus, no specific controls regarding the smoking ban were made at 
workplaces in this state. In this case, a strongly rooted political rivalry exacerbated the perceived 
divergence between the respective missions of the agencies, making convergence around a common 
agenda difficult. The process was exactly the same in another state (Fribourg). 
Cross-agency street-level divergence. A rural French-speaking state with little tobacco control 
experience (Jura) exemplifies policy divergence at the street level. In this state, the health agency was 
led by a SDP politician, while a LRP politician led the agency of economy, in charge of the hygiene 
inspectorate in the bars and restaurants. With the implementation of the new program, the health 
agency aimed at deploying controls in bars and restaurants, because the state was known for frequent 
infringements. Smoking in bars and restaurants was a deeply rooted habit in the state, where the 
tobacco industry was a significant economic and political player. Hence, the tobacco industry’s strong 
presence and the lack of specialization in tobacco control were important conditions contributing to 
the weak policy compliance. According to the program managers, there was a relative indifference 
from the head of the agency of economy. At the street level, the hygiene inspectorate responsible for 
the controls of the ventilation in bars and restaurants demonstrated a passive but strong blockage. 
Because of these negative conditions, the SLBs put forward various arguments against the 
intensification of this enforcement task.  
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First, they claimed that public health tasks did not belong to their mission, and that a strict separation 
of roles between the different groups of professionals would increase the credibility of their respective 
missions. Second, their priority was to control technical installations and food hygiene, to ensure 
customer safety. Finally, they argued that implementing random controls would be too costly and 
would hamper their other priority tasks. This example shows how a passive street-level divergence 
process can occur in spite of a formal but de facto weakly supported cross-agency policy agreement, 
and the challenges faced by a managing agency when it has no official authority over the relevant 
implementing actors. In a German-speaking state (Baselland), the situation regarding controls at 
workplace was very similar, with the health office responsible for the policy having no authority over 
the food inspectorate and labor inspectorate, who refused to collaborate.  
Cross-agency street-level convergence. Finally, the analysis reveals a number of cases (St.Gallen, Zug, 
Uri, Solothurn, Valais, Neuchâtel) with cross-agency street-level convergence that led to policy 
compliance. In those cases, health agencies successfully collaborated with other agencies to control 
restaurants and the number of controls met or exceeded the policy objectives and ensured proper 
enforcement of the ban. There existed implicit approval of the planned implementation measures at 
the head of agencies in all these cases. However, support was much weaker than in the cases of policy 
convergence, taking the form of political indifference. In the state of Valais, a former bureaucrat of 
the health agency played a key role in creating street-level convergence since he later took office as a 
middle-ranked manager of the police in one of the state’s biggest cities. He actively maintained his 
ties with his former colleagues and became the transmission belt between the health agency and the 
municipal police by taking part in an interagency working group on second-hand smoke as a 
representative of the police. Having a double professional credibility at the intersection of these two 
groups, he strongly—and successfully—pushed the municipal police to undertake control tasks related 
to the smoking ban that could not be performed by the health agency (e.g., controls in bars at night 
during their usual patrols).  
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By framing the smoking ban enforcement as a question of law and order, this policy intermediary 
translated the public health needs towards its new colleague in the police, thereby generating cross-
agency street-level convergence around common objectives. Hence, the existence of intersecting 
actors able to relay the policy objectives across agencies and the issue framing as pertaining to the 
professional duties of different groups of SLBs also played as favorable factors. In other states such as 
St.Gallen, the seamless collaboration between SLBs of the lead and partner agencies was due to the 
successful establishment of a steering body gathering middle-managers of the different agencies. 
Pragmatic decisions were taken together in the steering committee, which was an important condition 
for convergence. Table 1 summarizes the conditions identified in the case studies leading to the four 
(non-)compliance configurations.  
Table 1: Conditions Triggering (Non-)Compliance Configurations 
 

























● Implementation clashes 
● High political salience 
● High media coverage about non-compliance 
● Politicization 
● Bottom-up blame attribution from SLBs to 
head of agency  
● Political blame avoidance reaction 
● Political credit attribution to the lead and 


















● Low political salience  
● Policy perceived as legitimate  
● Cross-agency committees  
● Pragmatic solutions (integration of controls 
in routine tasks of inspectorates) 
● Joint definition of enforcement measures  
● Intersecting actors activating SLB-groups 


















● Competing  parties at the head of 
agencies 
● Conflicting policy goals and political 
clienteles (expected negative political 
reward) 
● Policy perceived as illegitimate (smoking in 





















● Strong economic interests against the policy 
- low public acceptance 
● Lack of administrative specialization 
● Conflicting professional ethos (SLBs think 
public health does not belong to their 
mission) 
● SLBs think a clear separation of tasks among 
agencies increases everybody’s credibility  
● (Perceived) scarcity of resources: 
prioritization of other policies 
Note: Not all of the listed conditions, but different combinations of them were found in each state. 
States with two enforcement projects are listed twice. 
 
 
Discussion: A refined understanding of policy compliance in cross-agency situations 
Policy implementation is the result of decisions made at the political level and actions taken by the 
implementing agencies (Pülzl and Treib, 2007). Thereby, tensions between politicians’ decisions and 
the SLBs’ discretion have been identified to be important drivers for non-compliance. This paper 
focuses on (non-)compliance in a multi-sector implementation context. The federal context of the case 
study allowed to compare highly similar initial situations in 12 governance units and to observe a 
diversity of cross-agency convergence and divergence processes, both at the political and street-level. 
However, similar phenomena might equally occur in non-federal political systems, as long as agencies 
responsible for the enforcement have to rely on other agencies without having authority over them. 
Borrowing from the literature on policy sector coordination, our results confirm that the institutional 
design or what has been called ‘distinctiveness’, i.e., the “horizontal separation into different 
ministries and administrations” (Trein, 2017b:  422), is crucial in understanding street-level 
compliance in cross-agency contexts.  
Difficulties related to interagency collaboration exist because the agencies defend their own, often 
diverging, interests (Hustedt and Danken, 2017), sometimes resulting from partisan competition 
because the different agencies are led by different political parties (Busch, 2008).  In turn, where 
different actors have different priorities, struggles for resources in multi-actor and interdepartmental 
settings can be expected: “the agency’s commitment to the networked service or activity must be 
asserted and successfully defended in the face of competing claims from other organizational actors 
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for a share of the organization’s resources” (O'Toole et al., 1997: 142). It is thus important to 
distinguish between non-compliance resulting from factors lying outside the SLBs’ area of competence 
(cross-agency political divergence) and non-compliance caused by competing agendas of these street 
level actors (cross-agency street-level divergence). 
The presented evidence shows that the roots of non-compliance can be manifold in multi-actor 
contexts that include different hierarchy levels and different sectors. Compliance issues can exist when 
all street-level actors could be willing to comply with policy targets, but missing resources (that are 
not provided by the political level) reduce their capacity. This is a typical case for political divergence, 
where the way out of the blockage is an escalation to the political heads of agencies. If this strategy is 
chosen depends on the responsible person’s estimation of the prospects of success and the 
assessment of the associated risks. If escalation is avoided, non-compliance is the outcome. However, 
choosing this way of action can be a tactic to pass on the potential blame for non-compliance from 
the street-level to politicians.  
The reaction of the head of agencies have proved to be strongly related to the policies’ nature. 
Comparing the smoking bans in restaurants and in workplaces helps to identify central conditions 
deciding upon political divergence or convergence: 1) The social acceptance of the smoking ban in 
restaurants is higher than in workplaces; 2) the enforcement in restaurants is more visible than in 
private companies; 3) sectors affected by the ban in the workplace are an electoral clientele that 
politicians do not want to alienate, whilst the ban in restaurants was often also supported by the 
restaurants because the policy was the result of a political compromise. Thus, the public salience of 
the topic in the workplace is politically lower because there never was a huge debate comparable to 
the case of restaurants, which makes the latter issue riskier for politicians. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that the head of agency will unblock situations by increasing the SLBs’ capacity to act (e.g., 
allocating resources) in policy areas that are politically less risky for the heads of agencies. This result 
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is in line with expectation 1 postulating that cross-agency political convergence tendentially fosters 
street-level convergence and policy compliance.  
However, we only observed political convergence in one out of 12 cases, which illustrates the limited 
relevance of top-down induced cross-agency collaboration in practice. Moreover, in the respective 
case, political convergence was the result of bottom-up pressure created by SLBs. This goes in line 
with the claim in the literature on horizontal coordination that forcing organizations from different 
sectors to cooperate with “purely top-down, hierarchy-like coordination” is not sufficient in itself 
(Molenveld et al., 2020b: 18). Expectation 2 proposing that political divergence is associated with 
street-level non-compliance is also supported, since divergent political priorities at the head of 
agencies led to at least a temporary blockade of the implementation at the street level. The political 
divergence opened the door for SLBs of partner agencies to prioritize other tasks more directly 
associated to their core mission. 
Importantly, compliance problems also occur in cases of political indifference, where there is a formal 
political agreement without explicit political signals to SLBs to implement the measures. Political 
indifference (as compared to political convergence or divergence) was the most frequent scenario, 
where it was decided at the street level whether to comply or not. This indicates that divergences 
between the will of the political level and SLBs leading to non-compliance might be in practice less 
common than previous literature has indicated, because de facto political indifference was 
overlooked. Various conditions led to an opposition of the SLBs in non-health-related agencies in 
situations of political indifference (see Table 1). The arguments of the SLBs to justify their blockage of 
the enforcement activities were that: 1) there existed an already good level of target-group 
compliance, 2) police and inspectorates lack the legitimacy to implementing public health measures, 
which are not part of their mission and 3) they had limited resources.  
In fact, deficient performance of SLBs is often caused by an interaction of high workload, constrained 
resources and SLBs’ perception that the policy does not make sense (Thomann 2015). Additionally, in 
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a situation of scarce resources, cross-agency objectives are often not prioritized, particularly because 
implementing actors may be confronted with “conflicting control signals” since “objectives cut across 
vertical control lines” (Molenveld et al., 2020a: 2). As the present study shows, the range of 
intervening factors is exacerbated in cross-agency settings, and explains the diversity of street-level 
reactions to political indifference at the top of the agency (i.e., Figure 1). It can thus be asserted that 
“institutional and legal complexity gives rise to ambiguity and uncertainty, making possible 
entrepreneurial definitions of the law” (Sheingate's 2007: 19). 
In cases of street-level divergence, the disconnection between program responsibility (i.e., head of 
agency) and implementation responsibility (i.e., at the street level) in the structure of the policy 
delivery represents a major challenge. Neither does the lead agency of the program have the authority 
to force SLBs from other agencies to comply, nor have partner agencies direct incentive to collaborate. 
As argued by Molenveld et al. (2020a: 2) “the coordination of crosscutting policy programs is 
characterized by diffuse control and accountability arrangements without a clear allocation of 
responsibility and a lack of strong incentives”. In particular, partner agencies may not necessarily 
benefit from the political credit of successful implementation and even be hurt politically depending 
on their electoral clientele.  
Despite these risks, in most cases, SLBs managed to achieve street-level convergence, even in the 
(frequent) case of policy indifference. The results indicate various conditions that are conducive to 
cross-agency street-level convergence. First, a policy can be framed in different ways depending on 
the SLBs professional background. Second, the agencies required for implementation have to be 
incorporated early in decision making processes by institutionalizing interagency cooperation. SLB 
scholars can in this aspect learn much from the literature on interdepartmental and horizontal 
coordination, which has investigated the importance of institutional design strategies (Alexander, 
1998; Hustedt and Danken, 2017) and has stressed that “involving the implementing organizations in 
the design of the coordination arrangement is important” (Molenveld et al., 2020b: 9). Third, the 
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existence of a strong intermediary willing to find compromise at the intersection of the different 
sectors is of crucial importance. Such individuals can translate specific issues into the professional 
language of each involved sector to increase the policy’s legitimacy. This goes in line with Danken 
(2017: 207) who found that besides “visible political leadership”, also “individual bureaucrats’ skills 
[…] mattered for overcoming departmental resistance”. From this perspective, compliance is not only 
a matter of hierarchy, rules and sanctions, but also of identity, trust and beliefs of policy implementers 
(Dunlop and Radaelli, 2018: 266). Fourth, the capacity to attribute some of the political credit to the 
partner agency for the successfully implemented policy is also an important factor fostering political 
convergence. Those four types of mechanisms help achieve a crucial requirement for the setting up 
of coordination: breaking the status quo and shaking organizations out of their patterns (Peters, 2015). 
As suggested in Expectation 3, indifference at the political level can result in both street-level non-
compliance and compliance, depending on the capacity to create a bottom-up dynamic around the 
issue. Being aware of dynamics happening between SLBs of different agencies might help to consider 
complex responsibility-capacity constellations. Furthermore, the different types of horizontal 
coordination and issue-coupling influence the way “conflicts rise to the top level in the policy making 
process” (Hernes, 2020: 2). Interestingly, we found that a lack of official issue-coupling among 
agencies, due to political indifference, might also favor policy compliance by allowing street-level 
convergence and the implementation of potentially unpopular measures out of the spotlight.  
Expectation 4 proposed that in case of political indifference, street-level convergence would be 
hampered by a high agency salience. This expectation was confirmed, especially when strong local 
economic interests were at stake, coupled with a limited public acceptance of the policy. The policy 
was then perceived as illegitimate by SLBs from the partner agency, and a whole range of professional 
norms were put forward to justify non-compliance. On the contrary, a low salience left room for the 
alignment of SLB’s objectives and the establishment of cross-agencies solutions. This shows that SLB’s 
might be sensitive to the social and public salience of an issue even in cases when politicians are not. 
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Finally, we did not find any mixed case of political divergence combining with street level 
convergence—or vice versa—in our study. However, the SLB literature has shown the existence of 
such vertical mismatches. The application of our conceptual framework to such mismatch cases would 
allow to further specify the conditions likely to lead to each policy constellation and to refine the 
model. 
Conclusion 
Our study underlined that the formal acceptance of a public policy by the government does not 
necessarily go with an effective implementation will from all involved parts. Announcement effects 
constitute a typical feature of political life (Pülzl and Treib, 2007), but the incentive to effectively 
enforce the public measures proactively afterwards may be insufficient. Thus, in the case of political 
divergence during the implementation at the level of agencies heads (i.e., political divergence), it is 
the rule-makers themselves who fail to comply with the rule. This raises a whole series of questions 
and opens paths for future research, to nuance our understanding of “selective compliance” (Mayntz, 
2003).  
Second, our results highlight the importance of cross-agency dynamics, and show under which 
conditions partner agencies can have an interest in implementing a policy program issued by another 
agency and under which conditions other considerations—such as electorate policies and competing 
policy objectives—take over. Furthermore, the existence of political indifference during 
implementation should receive more attention in future. In this scenario, non-compliance does not 
result of divergence between the political and the street levels, but between two groups of SLBs. 
Although the literature on street-level bureaucracy tends to focus on the divergence between 
governance levels (politics vs. street-level), the divergence or convergence effects among SLBs remain 
understudied (Carpenter and Krause, 2015). The difference between cross-agency political 
indifference, divergence or convergence, and cross-agency street-level divergence or convergence 
should be systematically studied. As Peters (2006) and Molenveld et al. (2020a: 2) underline, 
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horizontal cooperation between agencies faces important challenges in terms of clientele politics and 
accountability issues, due to their thematic entrenchment. Possible games between different agencies 
are more complex in cases of cross-agency policies, which are key for tackling some of the major 
contemporary societal issues. We therefore argue that a future research agenda should combine the 
literature on SLBs with research on policy coordination considering challenges that specifically result 
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